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Abstract
The main thesis of this article is that Western societies risk becoming
Balkanized if they confront the superdiversity issue without sound
management of intolerance. The Balkanization process has some essential
features that allow the use of this term outside the area of origin (namely
the Balkan Peninsula). Thus:
It always affects a diverse political unit that comprises an inextricable
medley of racial, ethnocultural, religious, ideological, or gender identities.
It emerges only where neither the hegemony principle nor the
confederacy principle can sustain a divided population’s peaceful
coexistence.
It entails “antagonistic and conflict-oriented relationships resistant to
resolution” between the groups or classes dissociated from a diverse
political unit.
It increases the density of physical and psychological boundaries
between the formerly associated parts.
It is perpetuated by the great sponsors of the dissociated parts.
Any diverse political unit can enter a process of Balkanization,
regardless of its degree of culture and civilization. Balkanization does not
have a fatal course. Just as there is no society immune to Balkanization,
there is no diverse society doomed to Balkanization. Balkanization can be
prevented, checked, stopped, or reversed, depending on society members’
individual and collective actions.
To survive, the superdiverse liberal democracies from the Euro-Atlantic
area need an agonistic public sphere, where actionable truths emerge from
a genuine clash of educated opinions. If intolerance management is the first
step in preventing the Balkanization of a superdiverse political unit,
promoting social and political tolerance towards all people who express
educated opinions is the best starting point to genuine tolerance. The return
to Enlightenment rationalism values that underpinned our freedom of
thought and expression will help us meet the challenges inherent in current
and future superdiversity. By feeding enlightened conversations and debates
with genuine, educated opinions, people learn to have tolerance for
“unpleasant” pieces of knowledge. Then, they spread general tolerance –
as a by-product – across the entire society.
Keywords: Balkanization, superdiversity, identity, intolerance, social
tolerance, political tolerance, educated opinion, agonistic public sphere
Introduction
In order to survive and thrive, any human society must achieve a proper
balance between order and disorder. Highlighted by human relationships’
regularity and uniformity, the excess of order tends to ossify and stiffen
society. Excessively ordered societies can no longer respond adaptively to
environmental challenges; they go into decline, decay, and eventually
disappear despite their members’ apparent cooperation. Characterized by
the blatant manifestation of differences and the proliferation of conflicts,
excessive disorder undermines the relations of cooperation and mutual aid,
impedes the production and exchange of products, and plunges the entire
society into chaos and poverty. Anarchist societies create a space for
everyone to fight against everyone. In the end, such societies disappear as
well. A healthy human society avoids both absolute order and total anarchy.
It ensures their survival and development by looking for optimal mixtures
of homogeneity, diversity, cooperation, and separation.
In recent decades, Euro-Atlantic societies have undergone significant
demographic, technological, political, social, economic, and cultural
changes. Some of these changes were produced deliberately; others were
caused by processes independent of the individuals’ reason and will (Hayek
1952). Following these changes, Euro-Atlantic societies have reached a
dynamic equilibrium formula that combines liberal democracy’s attractors
with the market economy’s principles. Inclusion, political equality, political
pluralism, free elections, majority rule, and rational public debate (Young
2002; Kuehnelt-Leddihn 1952; Gastil 2008), on the one hand, and private
ownership of production factors, freedom of production, freedom of trade,
freedom of consumption, and the free price mechanism, on the other hand
(von Mises 1985), have favored both participation in political life and
increased prosperity. Besides, the sophisticated use of communication
technologies and the globalization process allow Euro-Atlantic businesses
and other organizations to operate internationally (cf. Aslam et al. 2018). As
expected, they benefited fully from the generalized interconnectedness and
constant flows of commodities, knowledge, and ideas worldwide. Never
and nowhere in human history have people reached the current level of
freedom and well-being existing in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Like any other human product, the Euro-Atlantic type of society is not
perfect. However, it is better than all other existent types. If it wasn’t, why
would millions of migrants worldwide strive to reach and live in Western
countries? The number of foreign-born people as a percentage of the total
population is high in most countries that share Euro-Atlantic cultural
values: Italy (10.4%), France (12.5%), USA (13.6%), UK (13.8%), Sweden
(18.8%), Austria (19.4%), and Australia (29.6%) (OECD 2020). In
particular, “[b]etween 2000 and 2009, Spain’s foreign-born population more
than quadrupled, rising from under 1.5 million to over 6.5 million”
(D’Ancona 2016, 571). It is reasonable to assume that migrants consider the
destination country more attractive than their country of origin. If it were
otherwise, migrants would not leave their homelands.
As is often the case, Western countries risk becoming victims of their
own success. Already diverse due to their intrinsic pluralism and the
proliferation of gender, religious, or cultural identities, Euro-Atlantic
societies became superdiverse (Bélanger 2019; Spoonley 2014) by
absorbing successive waves of migration from an increasing number of
source countries. They face a dramatic increase in the scale and scope of
minority ethnic and immigrant groups” (Spoonley 2014), having to manage
a postmodern or, more precisely, anti-modern current of opinion.
Western states have become what they are due to a winding process of
modernization that has led to abolishing legal privileges and
discriminations. The thrust toward uniformity and unification was doubled
by a cultural crusade, more precisely, by a “powerful and relentless drive to
extirpate differences in values and ways of living, customs and speech,
beliefs and public demeanor” (Bauman 1990, 72). By contrast, the current
anti-modern movement that tries to mold the Euro-Atlantic public sphere
promotes a peculiar superdiversity without creating a higher unity level.
The promoted superdiversity includes the immigrant communities and
specific gender, ethnic, racial, and religious identities, provided that all
these minorities can be considered victims of discrimination, intolerance,
and exploitation. The promoters of superdiversity assume the role of
deciding themselves which minorities should be protected from
discrimination, intolerance, and exploitation. Besides, they assume the
privilege to be intolerant of those who challenge their opinions and
judgments.
The article’s central thesis is that Western societies risk becoming
Balkanized if they confront the superdiversity issue without sound
management of intolerance. The superdiversity activists have already
imposed an ideological frame, in which the adherents of the modern
establishment are labeled as exploiters of an increasingly branched network
of oppressed minorities. If the ideological struggle on the superdiversity
problem is not waged in a climate of tolerance, Western societies will
fragment into a multitude of communities. They will orient themselves
towards unresolved conflict relations, inclined to use violence and to be
distrustful of any elite’s legitimacy. The very foundations of the Euro-
Atlantic civilization would be at stake.
Fortunately, no matter how bitter the ideological struggle, it can have a
happy ending if the parties involved agree to build an agonistic public
sphere (Dahlberg 2007) and transfer into the private sphere the values that
do not allow a reasonable compromise to be reached (Beligman 1999). The
agonistic public sphere and the privatization of issues causing unresolved
conflicts could form the tolerance formula that allows superdiversity to be
kept under control. To justify the assertions mentioned above, I will use the
scholastic method to examine the relevant aspects of the problem from
opposing points of view regarding known facts and human reason (NCE
2019).
Balkanization: from yesterday to today
Used at first to denote “a process of national fragmentation of former
geographical and political units into new problematic national states with
disrupted political relations, as in the case of what happened during the
Balkan wars” (Zemon 2018), the term “balkanization” was gradually loaded
with a multitude of blended connotations, most of them pejorative. Today, it
conveys, among others, differences, barbarism, tribalism,
underdevelopment, noncooperativeness, political, economic and
demographic disintegration, territorial disintegration, parcelization,
corruption, economic instability, breach of human rights, dehumanization
and devastation of civilization, gender enclaves, gated communities,
divergence over time of human languages, programming languages and data
file formats, postmodernism and deconstruction, a threat to centralized and
coercive systems, etc. (cf. Veliu 2018). Besides, some people see
Balkanization as a process opposite to “Europeanization,”
“Westernization,” or “modernization” of a space characterized by diversity
(cf. Todorova 2009, 13).
It is obvious that no one can use the term “Balkanization” as a useful tool
for knowledge if accidental, exaggerated, or simply incorrect connotations
are taken into account. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of
the concept of Balkanization by selecting those attributes that appear to be
both essential and characteristic.
Firstly, Balkanization always affects a diverse political unit that
comprises an inextricable medley of racial, ethnocultural, religious,
ideological, or gender identities. Such political units can be equally
multiethnic states (such as Turkey and Austria-Hungary) or non-ethnic
states (such as the United States) in which confidently self-asserted group
identities proliferate as the common citizenship culture fades. It is
noteworthy, however, that diversity in itself does not automatically lead to
Balkanization. As an example, “[f]or centuries the Balkan Peninsula was
almost the only part of Europe with a tradition of tolerance toward people
of different religions, ethnic origins, and cultures. (…) [T]he peoples of the
Balkans lived in a multicultural milieu long before it became fashionable in
the West” (Zemon 2018). Diversity is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for Balkanization. If adequately managed, diversity can be a
source of development and prosperity, as is Switzerland’s case.
Secondly, Balkanization emerges only where neither the hegemony
principle nor the confederacy principle can sustain the peaceful coexistence
of a divided population (cf. Mowrer 1921, 3). A diverse society is governed
by virtue of the hegemony principle if people commonly perceive the ruling
class as the strongest and most powerful constituent of society. As such, the
ruling class appears to be both apt and entitled to control others. A diverse
society is bound together by the confederacy principle when people consent
to live together as equal partners, without giving pre-eminence to a specific
social class. In this case, there is an enlightened consensus on society’s
basic principles and rules that prevent some ethnic or cultural differences
from putting society on the brink of disintegration.
Both principles can sustain a peaceful society but not under any
circumstance. For example, Turkey, Austria, and Hungary succeeded in
maintaining – for centuries – the peaceful coexistence of countless ethnic
and religious groups under the hegemony principle. However, the
weakening of the military and financial potency on the one hand, and the
attempt to double the political pre-eminence with the cultural assimilation
of minorities on the other hand, undermined the position of the rulers,
paving the way for Balkanization. The confederacy principle ensured – for
centuries – a peaceful and prosperous coexistence in Switzerland and
Belgium. Nowadays, it governs Switzerland with the same vigor but tends
to fade in Belgium. The Flemings’ growing distrust in the commonwealth
involving the Walloon population fuels the autonomist or even secessionist
tendencies.
Thirdly, Balkanization entails “antagonistic and conflict-oriented
relationships resistant to resolution” between the groups or classes
dissociated from a diverse political unit (Zemon 2018). In the absence of a
unique center of power able to control the entire political body and without
a general agreement on the principles and rules apt to curb diversity, all
parts dissociated tend to adopt a belligerent attitude toward the others.
Devoid of legitimate elites, having an exaggerated sense of self-importance,
suffering from insecurity or persecution-mania, and ineradicably convinced
of their own essential rightness (Mowrer 1921, 53-55), they aggressively
look for a place as advantageous as possible in relation to the former
partners. Inasmuch as the new political entities act as emotion-driven actors
rather than rational negotiators, it is no wonder that conflicts constitute the
norm and periods of peace are only an exception in the Balkanized areas.
Fourthly, as a consequence of the permanent state of conflict,
Balkanization increases the density of physical and psychological
boundaries between the formerly associated parts. An illustrative example
is provided by the Balkan region itself, which, at the end of the Cold War,
probably had the highest concentration of borders per square kilometer
(Ditchev 2019). Needles to say, the more borders appear, the more
contested they are, especially if they are established between certain social
groups within the same society. The borders between two Ex-Yugoslav
states were easier to accept and respect than the imaginary borders of “safe
spaces” established ad hoc on some American campuses. Because it is
practically impossible to establish cleancut natural, ethnic, or cultural
boundaries in a turbulent region, the borders themselves feed the conflicts.
Finally, Balkanization is perpetuated by the great sponsors of the
dissociated parts (Ditchev 2019). A multinational state’s successors have
great powers as sponsors that use local conflicts to achieve their own
geostrategic objectives. For example, before the First World War, the
“cause” of the Romanians, Serbs, Croats, and Greeks was “supported” by
France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain, respectively (Ditchev
2019). Nowadays, among the great powers involved in the Balkan region
are the United States, the European Union, and Russia.
When Balkanization affects a non-ethnic state, the sponsors of the
dissociated parts are political parties and multinational corporations. For
example, in the United States, the Democratic Party manifests itself as the
sponsor of an ever-increasing number of “oppressed minorities”: the
workers, African-Americans, Hispanics, members of LGBTQ+ minorities,
immigrants, etc. (2020 Democratic Party Platform). It is true that the
Democratic Party speaks on behalf of these minorities, but it is also true
that it instrumentalizes their real challenges to gain electoral support. Any
social category that automatically and overwhelmingly votes for a given
political party is the client of this party. The big corporations that offered
financial support to the Black Lives Matter movement (Hunter 2020)
manifested as sponsors of some contesting and dissociative forces from the
American society as well. The proper job of a company is to provide goods
and services on the market and not to pursue an anti-establishment political
agenda.
In conclusion, Balkanization is not the work of unpredictable, dangerous,
chaotic, dirty, lazy, primitive, cruel, selfish, or uncooperative people
(Zemon 2018) who live in a specific geographical area. Any diverse
political unit can enter a process of Balkanization, regardless of its degree
of culture and civilization. Balkanization does not have a fatal course. Just
as there is no society immune to Balkanization, there is no diverse society
doomed to Balkanization. Balkanization can be prevented, checked,
stopped, or reversed depending on society members’ individual and
collective actions.
If Balkanization depends on people’s actions and has destructive effects
(such as diversity intolerance, segregation, and self-segregation,
ghettoization, dictatorship, ethnic cleansing, misery, civil war, dissolution of
civilization), it is reasonable to seek efficient means to preclude it. This task
seems to be a priority in the Euro-Atlantic area where Balkanization’s
prodromes have been felt in recent years.
Intrinsically diverse, the Euro-Atlantic societies have to cope with tough
challenges: a radical and accelerated technological revolution, a revolution
of the economic structure from within, successive waves of immigrants,
diminishing trust in traditional institutions, and the lack of a new cultural
worldview that could incorporate both the “underinclusive” and
“overinclusive”106 particular cultures (Joppke 1996, 450). Unfortunately,
the new elements of diversity came before the old ones were sufficiently
assimilated, and, consequently, diversity transformed itself into
superdiversity (which is much more difficult to manage).
Superdiversity is here to stay because the culture is no longer and can no
longer be “contained, controlled, and homogenized” by the national states
(Joppke 1996, 450). As Michael Schudson said, “cultures flow in, out,
around, and through state borders” (cf. Joppke 1996, 450). Since no state
can enforce cultural assimilation and homogenization in a given area, the
only way to prevent Balkanization is to take a reasonable approach to
diversity. The first step in this direction is intolerance management.
Tolerance as a by-product of civilized societies
A superdiverse society avoids Balkanization only if diversity at one level
correlates with unity at the next higher level. More precisely, people can
peacefully face the unavoidable differences between them provided that
they are tied together by shared values, practices, and rules of conduct.
Because people’s “natural response” to differences is intolerance, tolerance
needs to be learned (Lee 2014, 712). The process of learning tolerance is
not an easy one at all.
First of all, to learn tolerance does not mean to condemn any form of
intolerance altogether. For example, it would be absurd to incriminate
people for their inability to take particular medicines or eat particular foods.
Persons who suffer from glucose, lactose, or alcohol intolerance cannot
ingest such substances without suffering harmful effects. Their innate
intolerance is, therefore, entirely acceptable. In the same way, if there were
innate forms of intolerance (having a physiological foundation) at the level
of human relationships, these forms of intolerance should be recognized and
accepted as well. Of course, the burden of proof would rest on the people
who claim to suffer from such innate intolerance. The most reasonable
default position is to reject the existence of an innate social intolerance that
would aim, for example, at some racial, ethnic, religious, or sexual
minorities.
Thus, intolerance that all people must overcome is not the inability but
unwillingness to put up with different ways of thinking and behaving.
Moreover, the intolerance management concerns not a private state of mind
but public behaviors that reveal it (Weissberg 1998, 9-10). As long as
intolerance remains an internal state invisible to others, it does not matter
for others, no matter how hateful it may be.
Intolerance must not be confused with the manifestation of private
preferences for certain people, values, beliefs, norms, or behaviors. No one
can be blamed for not dating certain persons, for not having any contact
with or for not cohabiting with them. Everyone may praise specific ideas or
behaviors which are criticized by others and vice versa. What is not
acceptable is the manifestation of subjective preferences in a public
situation, in which the selection criteria must neither advantage nor
disadvantage someone in terms of differences in race, nationality, sex, or
way of life.
Some scholars argue that tolerance can refer at the minimum to “a
resigned acceptance of or a passive indifference toward cultural and
political differences” (Lee 2014, 712). At a higher level, it would refer to
the “willingness to learn from others or even an enthusiastic endorsement of
differences” (Lee 2014, 712). However, as Robert Weissber said, we do not
live “in a world of complete worthiness” (Weissberg 1998, 8). Being
tolerant does not mean turning a blind eye to all intellectual and moral
deficiencies. It is truly recommendable to manifest a certain “skepticism or
tentativeness,” in other words, “a modesty (…) towards our own
epistemological claims” (Seligman 1999, 50), but we must not abandon – in
the name of tolerance – all reasoned standards, evaluations, and hierarchies.
It is not reasonable to enthusiastically endorse those differences that can be
proven to be deficiencies.
Different from ‘indifference’, tolerance is “the middle point on a
threepart scale of acceptability,” namely “a ‘window’ separating the
appreciated from the wholly unacceptable” (Weissberg 1998, 8-9). Tolerant
persons are willing to “put up with [innocuous] objectionable” (ibidem),
retaining their right to reject the perceived harmful objectionable. During
the whole process of discrimination between totally acceptable, totally
unacceptable, and innocuous objectionable, tolerant people display a
genuine modesty towards their epistemological claims.
According to some scholars, tolerance develops within a political unit as
social tolerance or political tolerance. Social tolerance is concerned with
“people’s willingness to accept disliked others into their everyday life” and
political tolerance with “people’s willingness to extend citizen rights and
liberties to members of disliked groups” (Lee 2014, 713). Recent history
has shown that extending the rights of some minorities in the name of
political tolerance can increase social tolerance. For example, recognizing
same-sex marriage as a human and civil right also heightens social
tolerance towards same-sex couples. On the other hand, the claims of
peculiar rights from other sexual minorities risk inducing mistrust and even
intolerance. It is not advisable to grant – in the name of political tolerance –
special rights to some social categories in contradiction with the level of
social tolerance.
In order to survive, any superdiverse liberal democracy needs an
agonistic public sphere, where actionable truths emerge from a genuine
clash of educated opinions. If intolerance management is the first step in
preventing the Balkanization of a superdiverse political unit, promoting
social and political tolerance towards all people who express educated
opinions is the best starting point to genuine tolerance.
The opinions that deserve plenary tolerance are formulated with modesty
and in a tentative manner. They are reasonable and evidence-based
judgments, oriented towards order and stability. The qualified people who
express them do not arrogate a privileged position to compensate for the
weakness of arguments and embrace solid moral values. They do not use
their opinions as weapons to stigmatize or marginalize other people,
especially the persons who contradict them.
Unfortunately, silencing thinkers who want to express their qualified
opinions in the academic environment has become a sad practice. People
avoid cognitive dissonance at all costs even if they undermine the core of
the Euro-Atlantic system of values: freedom of expression and the free
exchange of ideas. Seemingly paradoxically, the return to Enlightenment
rationalism values that underpinned our freedom of thought and expression
will help us meet the challenges inherent in current and future
superdiversity. By feeding enlightened conversations and debates with
genuine educated opinions, people learn to have tolerance for “unpleasant”
pieces of knowledge. Then, they spread general tolerance – as a by-product
– across the entire society.
Conclusions
The specter of Balkanization haunts the superdiverse societies from the
Euro-Atlantic area. Even though its prodromes do not seem severe yet, the
process of fragmentation and dissolution can accelerate at any time.
Fortunately, it is not too late to prevent or stop this process by promoting
social and political tolerance towards educated opinions expressed in the
agonistic public sphere. Accustomed to confronting genuine opinions in
enlightened discussions and debates, people can develop intellectual
tolerance and afterward – as a by-product ‒ general tolerance towards
diversity.
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Wiener Zentralstellen. Autor von vier Büchern sowie zahlreicher wiss.
Abhandlungen und Aufsätzen. Herausgeber mehrerer Sammelbänden. Von
2009- bis 2013 Dekan der Philosophischen Fakultät in Split, sowie
Präsident der Konferenz der Dekane der Philosophischen Fakultäten in
Kroatien
ZIDAR, BORUT (geb. 1980). Studierte Geschichte und
Erziehungswissenschaft an der Philosophischen Fakultät der Universität
Ljubljana. Danach studierte er Didaktik der Geschichte an der Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin und der Westfälischen-Wilhelms-Universität zu
Münster. 2015 Magisteranschluss im Bereich der Geschichtsdidaktik.
Während seines Studiums war er 2009 Stipendiat des KAAD. 2005 begann
er seine Tätigkeit als pädagogischer Berater und Grundschullehrer des
Faches Geschichte. Seit 2011 arbeitet er im Bereich von Schüler-
Wohnheimen: zumeist als Erzieher, zwei Jahre als Direktor eines
Schülerwohnheims in Ljubljana. Seit 2019 arbeitet er als Erzieher in einem
Schülerwohnheim in Kranj und ist seit 2020 Chefredakteur der
Fachzeitschrift “Iskanja”, die von der Gemeinschaft der slowenischen
Schülerwohnheime herausgegeben wird.
DAS OSTEUROPAPROGRAMM DES KAAD
WER KANN SICH BEWERBEN?
Kandidaten/innen aus Ländern Mittel-, Ost- und Südosteuropas, Kaukasus
und Zentralasiens mit guten Deutschkenntnissen (Niveau B2, bzw. bei
englischsprachigen Studiengängen mindestens A2, besser B1) und
katholischer Konfession (in Ausnahmefällen auch einer anderen
christlichen Konfession, sofern sie von katholischen Partnern vorgeschlagen
werden).
WAS FÖRDERN WIR?
Nachwuchswissenschaftler/innen und Postgraduierte, die
in ihrem Heimatland an einer Promotion bzw. Habilitation arbeiten
und einen Forschungsaufenthalt in Deutschland planen (bis zu 12
Monate)
eine Promotion mit Abschluss in Deutschland anstreben (max. 36
Monate)
nach dem Abschluss ihres heimischen Examens einen
Forschungsaufenthalt oder eine Vertiefung der vorhandenen
wissenschaftlichen Kenntnisse in Deutschland anstreben oder
ein nicht-konsekutives Aufbaustudium oder Zusatzstudium anstreben
(dies gilt auch für Fortbildungen von approbierten Medizinern).
Hochschullehrer/innen, die zu kurzen Forschungsaufenthalten (bis zu 6
Monate) nach Deutschland eingeladen werden.
Studierende in Masterstudiengängen im Heimatland, die einen
Studienaufenthalt zur Materialsammlung an einer Hochschule in
Deutschland planen.
Vollständige Masterstudiengänge werden gefördert, wenn diese im
Heimatland nicht angeboten werden. Voraussetzung ist ein B.A.
Studienabschluss im Heimatland.
Stipendien werden für alle Fachrichtungen vergeben (mit Ausnahme von
Theologie).
WAS ERWARTET DER KAAD VON IHNEN?
Ein überdurchschnittliches Leistungspotenzial für das Studium bzw.
die Forschung,
die Ausrichtung des Studiums oder der Forschung auf eine dauerhafte
Reintegration in die jeweilige Heimatregion (andernfalls gilt das
Stipendium als Darlehen),
kirchliches und soziales Engagement bzw. Bereitschaft zum
interreligiösen Dialog
WIE IST DAS ANTRAGSVERFAHREN?
Der KAAD hat ein zweistufiges Antragsverfahren.
Interessenten senden einen ausgefüllten Fragebogen, sowie einen CV an:
leimbach(at)kaad.de.
Wenn Sie für die zweite Stufe des Bewerbungsverfahrens in Frage
kommen, werden Ihnen die erforderlichen Antragsunterlagen zugeschickt,
diese senden Sie bitte bis zum 15. Januar (Stipendienvergabe März) bzw.
bis zum 30. Juni (Stipendienvergabe September) an das KAAD-
Osteuropareferat. Parallel senden Sie Fotokopien des Motivationsbriefes,
des Lebenslaufes, sämtlicher Gutachten sowie der Projektbeschreibung und
der Betreuungszusage an das Partnergremium in Ihrem Heimatland (falls
vorhanden).
Weitere Informationen und den Fragebogen finden Sie unter:
www.kaad.de/stipendien/osteuropaprogramm/
Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche
Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen
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